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Buying Power 
Community-Owned Electric Systems 
by THOMAS BROM and EDWARD KIRSHNER 
The public power movement shows signs of a rebirth .. Municipal electric systems offer 
cheaper rates and more responsible service-and they demonstrate that decentralized 
public enterprise works. 
The Aprill973 ballot in Berkeley, California, present-
ed voters with some unusual choices. Four radicals 
were running for city council. One of the several 
initiatives on the ballot called for legalizing marijuana 
in the city. But the item that seemed to generate the 
most opposition was an initiative innocuously refer-
red to as "Measure 8." 
Measure 8 called for municipal takeover of Pacific 
Gas and Electric's power distribution facilities in 
Berkeley. It reached the ballot thanks to a strong 
consumer action group called RIOT (Refusers of 
Illegal and Oppressive Taxes). And though some of 
the other initiatives were controversial, Measure 8 
appeared downright subversive. It drew the combined 
wrath of the Chamber of Commerce, the Berkeley 
Daily Gazette, the League of.Women Voters, two of 
the incumbent council members running for reelec-
tion, and, of course, Pacific Gas and Electric itself. 
Masquerading as the "Berkeley No on 8 Committee," 
PG&E used its own meter readers as election canvas-
sers. It coordinated tens of thousands of dollars' 
worth of newspaper ads, radio spots, and voter 
mailings. 
A private feasibility study of municipal power in 
Berkeley, commissioned by the city council in 1972, 
was the focus of campaign argument. Corporation 
lawyers, economists, and university professors bol-
stered diametrically opposed opinions with data from 
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the same study. But the report did conclude that 
"substantial long-term economic benefits would ac· 
crue to the people of the City of Berkeley if the City 
acquired and operated its own electric distribution 
system." That was hard to change. 
On April 17, Measure 8 lost by close to a three-
two margin. Proponents of municipalization had been 
outspent by more than twenty to one. PG&E and 
such financial backers as the Southern Pacific Land 
Company, three California banks, and a dozen other 
large corporations had poUI:ed nearly $100,000 into 
the campaign. This amounted to roughly five dollars 
for every "no" vote. 
Supporters of public power in Berkeley, though 
defeated in 1973, carried forward a long history of 
sporadic local struggle for public municipal utilities in 
America. There were four isolated municipal power 
plants in 1882. Today, there are more than 2,800 
public power systems, of which 1,775 are municipally 
owned."' But these public utilities, which include more 
than 90 percent of the nation's electric systems, 
. generate and distribute only one-quarter of America's 
power. 
The reason for the disparity is that municipal 
power systems are usually quite small. About a third 
of them are in five states-Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, 
Minnesota, and Ohio-each with over 100 municipal 
plants. Public power began in the 1880s in small 
towns. With a few exceptions, it has remained there. 
When electricity was . introduced, privately owned 
• Of the others, 26 are operated by federal agencies; 112 by 
state, county, or district agencies; and 932 by rural coopera· 
tives. There are 244 privately owned systems in the United 
States. 
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Dots indicate location of publicly owned electric systems in the United States. 
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utilities developed the den~, profitable urban mar-
kets first. Rural America never did get electricity 
until the federal government began the Rural Electri-
fication Administration in 1935. In between were the 
small towns, where people wanted electricity and had 
enough population density to make the job finan-
cially feasible. 
The subsequent growth of public power, however, 
was never peaceable. The private utility industry-the 
"power trust," as it was known in the late nineteenth 
century-was notorious for corruption, rate manipula-
tion, and profiteering. Public power was its enemy. 
On the other side, radical populists organized against 
the utility ll)onopolists. Public ownership planks ap-
peared in the People's Party platform in the 1890s, in 
the labor-populist allianees in the Midwest during the 
same period, and in local reform platforms from 1896 
onward. 
Later, though agrarian radicals continued to sup-
port public power, the issue began to lose its ideolog-
ical overtones. Some of the largest public power 
systems were built around the turn of the century, 
sponsored not by radicals but by "good government" 
urban reformers. These included Tacoma (1893), 
Jacksonville (1895), and Seattle (1902). By 1910, the 
number of public systems had reached 1 ,534. Cleve-
land began municipal power operation in 1914; Los 
Angeles and Springfield, Illinois, in 1916. 
Sixty years afterward, the "investor-owned utili-
ties" (IOUs) are regulated, respectable, and not nearly 
so unpopular. But there is still no peace between 
them and the public power systems. Bitterly fought 
takeover attempts by private utilities are frequent and 
often successful. The American Public Power Associa· 
tion (APPA) claims that it is good business for cities 
to operate local power distribution. Unfortunately, it 
is also good business for private corporations to do 
so. Many of the strongest surviving public power 
cities lie near federal dams, protected from private 
utility incursion by a steady source of cheap energy. 
These systems are the heirs of the New Deal, which 
produced 1V A, Boulder Dam, the Bonneville Project, 
and hundreds of smaller power plants. Many of the 
other municipal systems, scattered across the Midwest 
and down the Pacific Coast, are more vulnerable. 
While they have favorable economies and a record of 
.. 
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long public service to sustain them, solid political 
support has virtually evaporated. And in the past the 
difference between them and the IOUs has been 
measured in popular support, not simply in the 
superiority of the public systems' cash-flow charts. 
Today, of course, the superiority of the cash-flow 
charts may take on renewed importance. Consumers 
hard pressed by inflation may welcome the cheaper 
electricity customarily provided by municipal power. 
To be sure, energy shortages have put the squeeze on 
public power systems. Long-standing ties between 
large private utilities and the major energy companies 
put public power at a great disadvantage in the 
scramble for generator fuels. 1 However, public power 
may find opportunities as well as difficulties in the 
"energy crisis." Oil shortages, power curtailments, 
and the possibility of rationing have all been met with 
a good deal of anger and suspicion. For the first time 
since the New Deal, public demands are fostering 
proposals in Congress and state legisla~ures for gov· 
ernment intervemion in the energy industry. Electric 
utilities regularly fmd their requests for rate increases 
challenged. 
If the role of public enterprise in energy is to be 
expanded, public power systems offer a useful model. 
They work. And they bring a variety of benefits tCI 
their customers. 
Paying Less for More 
The economics of public vs. private power are 
straightforward. Public power systems yield cheaper 
rates. Comparative statistics compiled over the past 
century show that this holds true for cities of all 
·sizes. Recent Federal Power Commission reports are 
equally convincing. FPC figures for public and private 
utilities in 1971 show lower costs per kilowatt-hour 
(kwh) in virtually every aspect of the public systems' 
operation. The savings are even more remarkable 
considering the typically smaller scale at which pub· 
licly owned utilities operate. • 
Where do these savings come from? .Exclusive of 
retained earnings, municipal utilities show an average 
of 30 percent lo.wer costs per kwh· delivered than 
private utilities. Of that total savings, 10 percent is 
due to municipal operating and maintenance efficien· . 
cies. Public systems spend. less on advertising, less for 
public relations, less for lobbying, less for local 
political donations, less for accounting and collec· 
tions, less for executive salaries, and less for internal 
• The average municipal system has about 15,000 customers; 
private systems average about 250,000 customers. 
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TABLE 1 1971 Electric Utility Comparisons* 
Basic Data Private Municipal 
Number of Utilities Included 213 550 
Annual Averages per Utility 
customers 271,300 14,100 
KWH sold (millions) 6,379 368 
revenues (millions) $104.8 $4.5 
operating revenue per 1000 KWH $16.43 $12.18 
net electric plant per 1000 KWH $60.58 $47.75 
operating revenue per customer $386 $318 
net electric plant per customer $1,424 $1,247 
Cost per 1000 KWH Sold 
Operations and Maintenance $2.80 $2.32 
Power 5.50 5.25 
Income Taxes .96 
Other Taxes and Net Contributions 1.75 1.30 
Interest 1.64 1.22 
Depreciation and Amortization 1.78 1.38 
Dividend Payments 
_.!:2! 
Total Costs $16.34 $11.47 
Oth~ Factors per 1000 KWH Sold 
Customer Earnings Retained $ 1.33 
Investor Earnings Retained .70 
Net Other Income and Deductions .61 .62 
Net Cost Less Ben~fit to Customer 
and Local Community 14.68 9.55 
*Federal Power Commission, Statistics of Pri11ately Owned 
Electric Utilities in the United States-1971 Classes.A and B 
Companies, and Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities 
in the United States-1971, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 
bureaucracy. Also, public systems both produce and 
purchase their power more cheaply (5 percent of the 
savings). They are exempt from income taxes (20 
percent). Their other taxes are lower too, though 
payments made in lieu of taxes reduce the savings 
from this item to 9 percent of the total. As public 
agencies, they can borrow money at cheaper interest 
rates (9 percent of the savings). Public systems have 
less expensive plants per customer and also sell more 
electricity per customer. This reduces the costs of 
depreciation and amortization per kwh delivered (8 
percent of the savings). And finally, the absence of 
dividend payments to investors accounts for 39 per· 
cent of the savings (see Table 1). 
The savings from internal efficiency, power pro-
duction, and the lack of return to outside investors 
account for more than half of the overall difference. 
And the comparison probably underestimates the 
true difference in system efficiencies. Private utilities 
iiiL. 
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on the average are much larger than .public ones, and 
the resultant economies of scale may be a hidden 
equalizing factor.t 
Public power systems, since they don't have inves-
tors to attract or pay off, retain more than twice the 
percentage of revenues that private utilities retain. In 
either system, these reinvested earnings increase the 
net value of the system. But in the case of private 
utilities, such an increase in value is reflected only in 
higher stockholder equity; each share of stock is in 
principle worth more. For public utilities, the in-
crease in value benefits the municipality or the 
customers. Rates can remain low. The utility can 
finance its own development without resorting to ' 
borrowing. This "public equity" adds an element of 
savings beyond the 30 percent out-of-pocket differen-
tial. 
The Edison Electric Institute, an organization 
sponsored by the private companies, makes much of 
the fact that public systems pay no taxes and are able 
to borrow through low-interest, tax-exempt ponds. 
According to the companies, public systems can sell 
cheaper power for these reasons alone. But the 
comparisons reveal that tax and interest benefits 
account for only a little more than one-third of the 
difference between public and private systems.* The 
predominant factors remain dividend payments and 
efficiency. 
Total taxes per kwh paid by private utilities do 
exceed those of municipal power systems. But these 
corporate taxes are paid; to federal, state, and a 
variety of regional and local agencies. Municipal 
power systems pay virtually all of their contributions 
in lieu of taxes directly to the city's general fund. 
California public power cities, for example, receive 
~bout ten times more money per kwh in in-lieu 
payments than lOU-served cities receive in taxes. 
Thus local communities (though not other govern-
mental units) benefit doubly from publicly owned 
power. Lower utility rates are combined with higher 
net revenues flowing to the city (Table 2). The 
Pasadena municipal power system contributes 16 
percent of its gross revenues, by city charter, to the 
t For example, in terms of operating and maintenance costs 
per kwh, the average private system is 20 to 60 percent more 
efficient than those private systems that are similar in size 
and other characteristics to the average municipal system. 
• Moreover, because public systems sell power more cheaply, 
the same number ·of kilowatt-hours delivered brings in less 
revenue. Leaving aside the income taxes paid by the private 
companies, tax and interest payments as a percent of revenue 
are roughly equal in the two cases. 
TABLE 2 
(in cents) 
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Relative Rates for All Electric Homes 
of 15,000 KWH Per Year* 
Payments to 
Rate/KWH* City/KWHt Net Rate/KWH 
Berkeley (PG&E) 1.5 2 .02 1.50 
Alameda 1.32 .33 .99 
Anaheim 1.39 .24 l.I5 
Burbank 1.25 .17 1.08 
Glendale 1.46 .25 1.21 
Los Angeles 1.38 .06 1.32 
Palo Alto 1.27 .39 .88 
Pasadena 1.60 .23 1.37 
Riverside 1.29 .16 1.13 
Santa Clara 1.33 .07 1.26 
Public Power 
City Average 1.37 .21 1.15 
% of Berkeley 90 1050 77 
*Federal Power Commission, "AU Electric Homes in the 
United States" FPC R-77. 
tCalifomia State Office of the Controller, "Annual Report of 
Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California-Fiscal 
Year 1970-71~'; Berkeley figure estimated from PG&E 
feasibility study. 
general fund. The public sy~tem in Glendale contrib-
utes 15 percent; Burbank, 7 percent; and Los An-
geles, with the country's largest city-owned power 
system, 5 percent, or $11.5 million annually. All four 
of these systems in the Los Angeles basin have lower 
rates for average residential use than the regional 
private utility, Southern California Edison. 
Far from "missing" private utility tax payments, 
public power cities also enjoy lower property tax 
rates than comparable cities served by private com-
panies. In public-power Alameda, California, the city 
tax rate per $100 assessed valuation is $2.16, com-
pared to $3.47 in PG&E-served Berkeley. In Burbank 
and Glendale, it's $1.59 and $1.20, compared to 
$2.25 in nearby private-power Santa Monica. In Palo 
Alto, it's $.74 compared to $1.34 in PG&E-served 
Mountain View. 
Certainly there are factors in these comparisons 
that are unrelated to utility system ownership. But in 
each case payments to the city by the municipal 
systems are higher per kwh than tax payments by the 
IOUs to private-power cities. Moreover, even if most 
of a public system's savings take the form of lower 
rates rather than in-lieu payments, the effect on taxes 
may be beneficial. Low electric rates attract busi-
so 
nesses, and a healthy local economy helps keep 
property tax levies down. 
Both property tax rates and electric power rates-
public as well as private-are generally regressive. 
Usually, however, there is a net progressive benefit 
for residential customers in public power cities if 
both property taxes and utility rates are lower than 
those in surrounding communities. Most municipal 
systems have achieved both lower power rates and 
lower taxes. Anaheim even mandates lower rates than 
the surrounding private utility territory in its city 
charter. Burbank and Glendale are taking the first 
steps toward equalized power rates (rather than re-
duced rates for large users), which would add to the 
progressivity of the system. 
A look at the special position of "regulated" private 
utilities helps explain why the comparison between 
them and public systems turns out as it does. The 
private power companies are, of course, owned by 
stockholders who demand a return on their invest-
ment. But since the 1930s, the IOUs are also govern-
ment-recognized monopolies that are subjectto regu-
lation in return for a guaranteed rate of profit. The 
regulated "rate of return" allowed by the Federal 
Power Commission and state public utility commis· 
sions currently ranges between 7 and 10 percent. 
Although these figures appear low, the percentages 
are deceptive. 
For one thing, investor-owned utilities routinely 
exceed their regulated· rates of return on private 
capital investments unrelated to utility operation. 
Many IOUs reinvest interest and earnings outside of 
the utility system,. thus producing an unregulated 
secondary ·income for the benefit of their stock-
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holders. Average return to stockholders' equity, after 
taxes, for the IOUs has equaled that for all manufac-
turing corporations since the mid-1950s. It has ac-
tually been higher in recent years. Most private utility 
return figures are currently between I 0 and 15 
percent, but Citizens Utility of Arizona and other 
IOUs have sometimes reached 25 percent levels. 
Hidden investments by utilities are only part of 
the strange world of regulated monopoly economics. 
The phrase "rate of return" in investment analysis 
usually means return to owners' equity. But in the 
special language of the IOUs, "rate of return" essen-
tially means total return on the company's entire 
investment, both debt and equity. A 10 percent 
allowable rate of return, for instance, doesn't mean 
that each stockholder may receive only I 0 percent of 
his investment annually. It means that the utility can 
distribute to its stockheilders up to 10 percent of its 
"rate base" (or, roughly, its totill investment). Since 
private utilities are normally financed by 50 percent 
equity and retained earnings and 50 percent debt, the 
effective rate of return to investors may be consider-
ably higher than the nominally allowed amount. For 
example, if some capital is borrowed at 5 percent and 
the allowable rate of return is 10 percent, the IOU 
can set its rates to earn 10 percent on that capital. It 
then can pay interest on the loan, and distribute the 
other 5 percent to its stockholders for a total return 
to equity of 15 percent. 
By using the entire investment as the lOU's rate 
base, the regulating agencies offer a premium on 
overinvestment. The higher the capital investment in 
land, buildings, equipment, etc., the higher the result-
ing dollar amount of profit allowed by the regulating 
agencies. If the allowable rate of return remains 
higher than the cost of borrowing money for new 
investment, the utility, as in the example above, can 
increase its effective rate of return by investing more 
capital and increasing the rate base. As long as the 
rate of return remains higher than the average cost of 
money invested over the life of the system-even 
though present capital costs might exceed the rate of 
return limit-the utility makes a profit. In any case, 
private utilities generally manage to keep the regula-
ted rate of return above the cost of money. 
The 1971 FPC comparative statistics on utility 
plant size and power cost per kwh suggest the IOUs' 
overcapitalization. Municipal power plants have 10 
percent less net electric plant per customer than the 
IOUs, but they deliver 12.2 percent more kwh per 
customer. The public power systems thus deliver 
more electricity per customer from less plant than the 
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private utilities. This is a good indication of the 
difference in capital efficiency. 
The irony of government regulation is that by 
guaranteeing a rate of return b'lsed on total invest-
ment, the regulators have destroyed any incentive for 
the IOUs to hold down capital costs. In fact, as we 
have seen, the IOUs have a disincentive for building 
cheaper, more efficient plants. Moreover, the com-
panies can set their rates to cover all their operating 
expenses before the rate of return is calculated, and 
can pass on all fuel increases. They thus have no 
incentive to locate cheaper sources of energy or 
introduce less costly operating and maintenance pol-
icies. 
Municipally owned power systems are not regula-
ted by other government agencies, although they do 
supply complete figures on plant oper:1hm to the 
Federal Power Commission. Cost per kwh and utility 
rates over the past 90 years show how good the 
public systems' fmancial performance has been. Their 
average costs, and the electric rates that refl~ct them, 
would be even lower if roughly half the systems. did 
not have to buy their power wholesale from private 
utilities. (The American Public Power Association 
reports that 912 municipal systems buy supplies from 
private utilities. Most are too small to construct and 
run their own power plants and are unable to pur-
chase from public suppliers.) 
Until the Otter Tail Power Company decision was 
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1973, private utili-
ties routinely refused to "wheel" power from alterna-
tive suppliers across their li~es to municipal systems. 
As a result, many public power cities were totally 
dependent upon local private generating companies 
for their power. 
Now, since they can combine and interconnect 
their systems across existing power lines, many of the 
municipals are constructing regional generation and 
transmission facilities. Wisconsin's Dairyland Power 
Cooperative, serving farms in Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
and Iowa, is building a large steam generating plant 
for use as a power pool. To get the economies of 
scale, Dairyland is building a larger unit than it needs. 
It plans to sell .the excess to private utilities. 
In the Pacific Northwest, the emphasis is on 
planning a "hydro-thermal" program to augment the 
power of the Bonneville Dams with large-scale steam 
generation. In the Missouri River basin, the existence 
of the cooperative Missouri Basin Systems Group 
made possible an REA Joan to Basin Electric Power 
Co-op for a 400,000-kilowatt coal-burning unit. And 
the I I public power cities of the Northern California 
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Power Agency plan a geothermal operation neat the 
town of Geyserville. Generating power from steam 
produced deep within the earth's crust, the coopera-
tive project is slated for completion by 1977. 
In Southern California, the municipal utilities have 
intervened in Edison's licensing and rate proceedings 
to demand limited participation in major Edison 
plant construction. By threatening antitrust action 
and delaying crucial plant expansion, the small public 
utilities have encouraged the formation of joint-
venture projects with private utilities. With a mini-
mum of capital, formerly small public utility depart-
ments and wholesale ouyers have thereby gained 
entrance to huge coal-fired and nuclear plants they 
could never have built on their own. The result has 
been continued lower rates for public power cities 
surrounded by the Southern California Edison Com-
plmy. 
Right now, simple economics may be the strongest 
argument for local public power. But another argu-
ment has to do with the advantages of local control. 
Public power facilities are commonly operated by 
city governments, local district agencies, or consumer 
cooperatives. ·These structures may be just as bureau-
cratic and unresponsive as any corporation. But at 
least they can be changed when the need arises. Local 
,..,_,.) F'vv..,-..r'"l. •. /'.f;-
ownership means local jobs. It means local control of 
management decisions, such as plant location, rate of 
expansion, placement of power lines, type of power 
generation, and of course electricity rates. In a more 
general sense, local ownership means the possibility 
of community decision making and a feeling of 
responsibility to the public. 
The recent fuel crisis in the Los Angeles basin 
showed how responsive public power agencies can be. 
With 48 percent of their low-sulfur generating oil cut 
off by the Arab embargo, the public power systems 
of Los Angeles, Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena 
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acted immediately to curtail power consumption and 
coordinate emergency fuel purchases. Each of the 
cities enacted legislation mandating cutbacks of 10 to 
15 percent for residential customers and 20 percent 
for commercial power users. The smaller municipal 
agencies in Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena pooled 
their fuel purchases and storage capacity. Receiving 
only minimal help from the Southern California 
Edison Company, the four public systems managed to 
secure needed fuel supplies while cutting power con-
sumption by nearly 17 percent. 
The private utilities have developed a standard set 
of responses to the local control argument. Gross 
disparities between management and workers' salaries 
at the private utilities-with some executives earhing 
10 to 20 times the average worker's wages and 
benefits-become a "monetary ir.n~--'':•Je" lacking in 
the public systems. Lower public-power management 
salaries, argue the IOUs, result in a scarcity of skilled 
executives. This makes for stodgy leadership that 
cannot react quickly to the changing technology of 
the power industry. The IOUs contend, that public 
ownership means political ownership subject to inef-
ficiency, misconduct, and corruption. 
The history of the public power movement indi-
cates that these charges are unfounded. Management 
is more difficult ·to attract for the smaller systems 
than the larger. That is true for both public and 
private power. Independent management audits and 
FPC statistics indicate that executive competence 
among all varieties of larger systems is approximately 
equivalent. To help develop the small systems, the 
American Public Power Association started a utility 
education program which has trained several hundred 
supervisory and other employees of public systems in 
the past several years. 
· The Tennessee Valley Authority and the Rural 
Electrification Administration are renowned both for 
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the quality of their management and for the lack of 
political interference in their operations. TV A in 
particular has an unsurpassed record for efficient 
performance and extraordinarily low rates. As for 
corruption and political graft among municipal util-
ities, the record speaks for itself. It shows that the 
IOUs are in no position to talk. 
Private Powers 
With all the benefits of public power, the question 
remains: why aren't there more community-owned 
systems? The answer to that lies with the private 
utilities and the carefully nurtured relationships they 
maintain with state legislatures and Congress. 
Coordinated national public relations, lobbying, 
and utility acquisition campaigns have been a hall-
mark of the private utilities since the days of the 
Samuel lnsull power trust in the 1920s. During those 
years the National Electric Light Association (NELA) 
sought to discredit the growing public power move-
ment with furious red-baiting tactics. NELA helped 
defeat the California Water and Power Act in 1922, a 
bill that would have created a state-owned power 
system patterned after the famous Ontario hydro-
electric power system in Canada. It attacked Pennsyl-
vania governor Gifford Pinchot and New York gov-
ernor Alfred E. Smith, both of whom supported a 
national "superpower" grid of public systems. Any 
congressmen who supported plans for the construc-
tion of federal dams on the Tennessee or Colorado 
rivers became NELA's enemies as well. 
Organizations that sought to coordinate the small 
municipal systems were special targets. These in-
cluded the Public Ownership League of America, the 
National Popular Government League, North Da-
kota's Non-Partisan League, state Municipal Owner-
ship Leagues, and the Socialist Party of America. But 
the exposure of lnsull power corruption during 
Federal Trade Commission hearings in the late 1920s 
discredited the NELA. Several years later it was 
disbanded, only to be replaced with four specialized 
groups: the Edison Electric Institute, the Electric 
Companies Advertising Program, the Electric Com-
panies Public Information Program, and the National 
Association of Electric Companies. 
Much of the conflict between private and public 
utilities now is fought by proxy in state legislatures. 
Where the private utilities are especially powerful, the 
laws governing municipal authority are a maze of 
restrictions. 
In many states, a municipality may not set up a 
utility to compete with an established private utility 
except after receiving a certificate of convenience and 
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necessity from a state commiSSIOn. Commissions 
typically issue such certificates only if the munici-
pality can show that existing service is inadequate or 
otherwise deficient. California and Illinois are notable 
exceptions to this practice. In Wisconsin, there has 
been a long and as yet unsuccessful campaign to 
permit municipal utilities to extend their lines with-
out state permission. Legislative control of public 
utility territories has tended to keep them small, 
preventing any economies of scale and protecting 
neighboring IOUs from rate competition. Elsewhere, 
the most widespread legislative tactic is severe limita-
tions on municipal bonding. These limitations include 
a low public debt limit for general obligation bonds 
and a requirement that the state approve the issuance· 
of revenue bonds. Virtually all of these restrictions 
grew out of the IOUs' efforts. 
Since the 1920s, private utilities have been lobby-
ing to end government tax-exempt bonding entirely 
in the hopes of shutting off lower-interest money for 
public systems. The Public Ownership 'League of 
America fought virtually the same proposed legisla-
tion in 1922 that the American Public Power Associa-
tion opposes today, this time in a form put forward 
by the Nixon administration. The Nixon tax proposal 
would substitute a system of government int(1rest 
subsidies for tax-exempt bonding. This would give the 
federal government de facto veto power over specific 
projects. 
Tax-exempt bonds, qf course, are hardly an 
equitable tax policy. rpey provide a convenient 
repository for corporate 1and individual wealth that 
can generate interest without incurring federal taxa-
tion. But while the policy exists, communities and 
utility districts should be able to make use of the 
bonds for the widest possible development. Municipal 
bonding that finances public power facilities is one of 
the few instances of public benefit in a sea of private 
benefits supported by the tax laws. 
The most direct and effective method of private 
utility attack is still the takeover move. It is usually 
coordinated with support from a regional utility 
association. Public Power magazine reported such 
takeover campaigns in the upper Midwest, throughout 
Ohio, and in Virginia during the period from March 
to August 1970. The magazine also revealed an 
Edison Electric Institute document establishing the 
policy. A typical campaign involves an attempt to 
influence the city council, construction of a "citizens' 
group," and large media expenditures. The partic-
ulars, catalogued year after year by the APPA mag-
azine, are distinguished only by the IOUs' willingness 
to use whatever will work. Red-baiting is employed if 
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the community is receptive to it, keying on such 
slogans as "socializing America." The takeover cam-
paigns don't always succeed, but the IOUs are pa-
tient. They continue to erode the number of public 
power cities. 
On the other side, fighting intermittent but deadly 
skirmishes with the private utilities, are the more than 
2,800 municipal, state, district, federal, and coopera· 
tive power systems. Many of these systems are 
members of either the American Public Power Associ-
ation or the National Rural Electric Cooperative 
Association. Although both organizations lobby from 
headquarters in Washington, neither has taken an 
aggressive role in promoting public power. Public 
power systems in general tend to be cautious and 
unwilling to take stands that might be unpopular with 
industry. 
For example, the crush of energy-intensive indus· 
tries such as aluminum and atomic fuel production in 
the Tennessee Valley has forced TV A away from its 
original hydroelectric power network. Once a paragon 
of concern for the public interest, TV A is now the 
largest single purchaser of strip-mined coal in the 
world. The coal fires the boilers of steam power 
plants that .are now· necessary to satisfy a huge 
industrial, military, and Atomic Energy Commission 
demand. 
Public power agencies in the Southwest exhibit . 
similarly narrow practices. Despite their usual respon-
siveness to local environmental concern in plant 
construction and air pollution standards, many public 
systems have joined in the Western Energy Supply 
and Transmission consortium to augment their power 
capacity. This group of 23 private and public.utilities 
is building a power grid of six massive coal-fired 
plants in the desert of the Colorado Plateau. Several 
of the plants use strip-mined coal from leases on 
Navajo and Hopi land. The Four Comers plant, the 
first built and the largest to date in the system, is the 
greatest industrial polluter in the country. 
In their defense, public power systems are bound 
by the present limits of energy production tech-
nology. They have not been the most strident 
promoters of coal-fired or nuclear plants. The diffl· 
cult decisions of rate structure, load growth, boiler 
fuel, and environmental standards are relevant to all 
electric utilities. Consideration of public opinion and 
response to local customers are still higher among the 
publicly owned systems than among the IOUs. 
Despite the obvious difficulties of building publicly 
owned and controlled industries in the U.S. economy, 
the public power movement has two things going for 
' . 
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it: a history of practical success, and a wave of public 
resentment against private energy corporations. Coali-
tions of new populists, consumer groups, community .. 
control organizations, urban planners, and liberal 
politicians are joining together in many communities 
to seek alternatives to private energy exploitation. 
The existing public power systems don't quite know 
what to make of this new attention. But they have 
often assisted consumer groups with the teohnical and 
legal problems involved in municipal power feasibility 
studies and condemnation proceedings. Many general 
managers of public systems have weathered criticism 
from the business community for years, and are not 
eager to be smeared for advocating public ownership. 
But others are overjoyed at the prospect of renewed 
public support, which has largely been lacking since 
the late 1930s. · 
On the national and state levels, public demands 
for control of the giant energy corporations have Jed 
to Senate proposals for a federal oil and gas corpora-
tion. There are proposals for state energy corpora-
tions as well. The 1V A-modeled state corporations 
would develop oil, natural gas, coal, geothermal, 
nuclear, and hydro resources on public lands, com-
peting with private industry in the market. The scale 
of the public enterprises could be massive; 50 percent 
of U.S. oil and gas reserves, 40 percent of coal and 
uranium, 80 percent of oil shale, and 60 percent of 
geothermal resources lie under public lands. Distribu-
tion of energy could remain local, retailed by public 
and cooperative utilities and gasoline stations. 
An initiative for this kind of energy development 
and wholesale power corporation in Maine narrowly 
failed in the November 1973 election. The new 
governor of Vermont, Thomas Salmon, has directed 
the legislature to draft proposals for state energy 
development, graduated rate structures, and minimal 
"lifeline" energy service for all state residents regard-
less of ability to pay. The impetus for his action came 
from a Nader-supported research group, some unions, 
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low-income and senior-citizen associations, and the 
Welfare Rights Organization. 
The broad issue of community ownership and 
control has fostered local coalitions in many states. 
The Georgia Power Project in Atlanta has begun 
organizing around utility rate increases, making alli-
ances with the Atlanta Labor Council, the Welfare 
Rights Organization, and the Tenants Council. 
Through its intervention with tlie state public service 
commission, the coalition gained a platform for 
attacking a variety of corrupt practices of the Georgia 
Power Company, and for presenting alternative rate 
and power distribution plans. 
In San Francisco, the push for public power has 
been led by the San Francisco Bay Guardian and a 
group called Power to the People. Municipal owner-
ship of PG&E's facilities in the city has been an issue 
since 1912, when the Raker Act mandated public 
power as. a trade-off for federal construction of the 
Hetch Hetchy water and power complex in Yosemite 
park, Through the years, PG&E has defeated eight 
separate attempts to issue municipal bonds for the 
system. The company bilks San Francisco out of $30 
million a year by re-routing Hetch Hetchy public 
power over its lines, then selling privately generated 
electricity to the city. In December 1973; a San 
Francisco grand jury issued a report to the Superior 
Court finding that PG&E was distributing electricity 
illegally in the city. Although the state public utilities 
commission promises to reply in defense of the 
present arrangement, the report has given new life 
and added leverage to public power groups. 
E&GP (Electricity and Gas for the People-Turn 
PG&E Around) has coordinated demands in the San 
Francisco Bay Area for lower utility rates and an end 
to virtually automatic PG&E profit and rate increases. 
Seeking to focus public anger at higher utility bills 
that parallel higher corporate profits, E&GP concen-
trates its attack directly on the private utility. Mean-
while, members of E&GP, Power to the People, and 
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RIOT hope to revive the move for municipalization 
this fall in both San Francisco and Berkeley. This· 
time they plan to be armed with campaign spending 
limitation ordinances to cm:tail massive PG&E corpor-
ate intrusion. 
The benefits of a new public power movement, in 
the spirit of the radical populists who began munici-
pal systems in the 1880s, would be both real. and 
symbolic. First, public power works, and its electric-
ity costs less. Second, municipal power systems prove 
that public enterprises can be efficient and profitable 
for the public, even within the present economy. 
They give the lie to the alleged superiority of private 
corporate organization. Moreover, public systems es-
tablished during the current mood of disgust with 
energy monopolies would be expressions of com-
munity power and proof of the vulnerability of the 
corporate giants. Despite the difficulties of condem-
nation proceedings, over 30 public power systems 
have been formed since 1960. And this May, the 
people in the upstate New York town of Massena 
voted overwhelmingly for a $5 million bond i~ue to 
buy back their electric system. 
By itself, public power isn't likely to transform 
America. It is not a widespread concern now, and 
because of the technical questions involved and the 
complications of power system condemnation pro-
ceedings, it is not likely to become one soon. But it is 
a concrete, workable example of community control 
and public ownership that can be an important 
adjunct to wider political programs. It's a beginning 
step toward revitalizing public energy as an alterna-
tive to continued corporate abuse. 
FOOTNOTES 
I. See Thomas Brom, "Edison vs. Public Power: The Squeeze 
in California," Nation vol. 218, no. 9 (March 2, 1974), pp. 
269-273. 
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